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Abstract 
This paper analyses the simplicity of the 
trust model adopted by the Shibboleth 
infrastructure and describes an enhanced 
distributed trust model and authorisation 
decision making capability that can be 
implemented by using X.509 attribute 
certificates and a Privilege Management 
Infrastructure such as PERMIS. Several 
different combinatorial approaches can be 
taken, depending upon the trust models 
adopted by the Shibboleth target and origin 
sites, and each of these are described. The 
paper also discusses whether user privacy, 
which is strongly protected by Shibboleth, is 
bound to be weakened by the use of X.509 
attribute certificates rather than simple 
attributes, and concludes that this does not 
have to be the case.  
1. Introduction 
Shibboleth [1] is a distributed web resource 
access control system that allows federations 
to co-operate together to share web based 
resources. It has done this by defining a 
protocol for carrying authentication 
information and user attributes from a home 
site to a resource site. The resource site can 
then use the attributes to make access 
control decisions about the user. The 
Shibboleth project is run by the Internet2 
consortium in the USA, and universities 
throughout the USA and Europe (at least) 
are now starting to build experimental 
services based upon it. 
 
At the heart of Shibboleth is a trust model 
that allows the members of a federation to 
cooperate together. This trust model, whilst 
functional, is somewhat limited. Basically 
each Shibboleth target resource site trusts 
each Shibboleth origin (home) site in the 
federation, so that whatever assertions – 
authentication or authorisation – are 
digitally signed by the origin site, they will 
be believed and trusted by the target site. 
There is little scope for differentiation 
between authentication authorities and 
attribute authorities, or for allowing more 
sophisticated distribution of trust, such as 
static or dynamic delegation of authority. 
 
Another limitation of the Shibboleth 
infrastructure is that it only provides a basic 
access control decision making capability. 
Whilst this is adequate for many use cases, it 
lacks the flexibility and sophistication 
needed by many applications, for example, 
to make access control decisions based on 
role hierarchies or various constraints such 
as the time of day or separation of duties. 
 
We realised that both these limitations could 
be addressed by integrating an X.509 
Attribute Certificate (AC) Privilege 
Management Infrastructure (PMI) [3] with 
Shibboleth. PERMIS [2] is one such 
infrastructure that has already been 
successfully integrated into Grid application 
target sites [4] to support the distributed 
management of trust. PERMIS incorporates 
a sophisticated policy controlled RBAC 
access control decision engine (also called a 
policy decision point (PDP)). The PERMIS 
PMI has been used to implement distributed 
trust management in Shibboleth. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
Shibboleth. Section 3 introduces the more 
sophisticated distributed trust model that we 
wanted to introduce into Shibboleth. Section 
4 describes how the trust model can be 
implemented using an X.509 PMI such as 
PERMIS. Section 5 describes the different 
combinations of X.509 ACs, attributes, and 
the PERMIS PDP that may be integrated 
with Shibboleth to provide the desired trust 
models of the Shibboleth target and origin 
sites.  Section 6 discusses user privacy 
issues and section 7 discusses revocation 
and performance issues that arise with using 
X.509 ACs. Finally Section 8 concludes. 
2. Overview of Shibboleth 
Shibboleth is a web based middleware layer 
that currently makes use of SAMLv1.1 [5] 
for encoding some of its messages. When a 
user contacts a Shibboleth resource site from 
their browser, requesting access to a 
particular URL, Shibboleth single sign on 
and access control takes place in two stages: 
– In stage one the resource site 
redirects the user to their home site, 
and obtains a handle for the user that 
is authenticated by the home site 
– In stage two, the resource site returns 
the handle to the attribute authority 
of the home site and is returned a set 
of attributes of the user, upon which 
to make an access control decision. 
In a large distributed open environment 
stage one has a number of complications. 
Firstly how does the resource site know 
where the user’s home site is? Secondly, 
how can the resource site trust the handle 
that is returned? The answer to these two 
questions is surprisingly simple, and is part 
of the Shibboleth trust model. When the user 
first attempts to access a resource site, 
he/she is redirected to a Where Are You 
From? (WAYF) server, that simply asks the 
user to pick his/her home site from a list of 
known and trusted home (Shibboleth origin) 
sites. The target site already has a pre-
established trust relationship with each 
home site, and trusts the home site to 
authenticate its users properly. This is 
facilitated by the exchange of public key 
certificates or the use of a common trusted 
root Certification Authority. In the latter 
case both sites will have been issued with a 
certificate by the root CA (or one of its 
subordinates). When a digitally signed 
SAML message1 arrives from the home site, 
such as one containing a user handle, this 
can be validated and trusted by the resource 
site. 
 
After the user has picked his/her home site, 
their browser is redirected to their site’s 
authentication server and the user is invited 
to log in. If a user is untrustworthy and tries 
to fool the system by picking a home site to 
which they do not belong, they will have 
difficulty authenticating themselves to that 
site’s authentication server, since they won’t 
have any valid credentials. However, if they 
pick their own home site, they should find 
authentication is no problem. After 
successful authentication, the home site re-
directs the user back to the resource site and 
the message carries a digitally signed SAML 
authentication assertion message from the 
home site, asserting that the user has been 
successfully authenticated by a particular 
means e.g. username/password, Kerberos or 
digital signature. The actual mechanism 
used is local to the home site, and the 
resource site simply has to have a prior 
agreement with the home site which 
authentication mechanism(s) will be trusted. 
If the digital signature on the SAML 
                                                 
1 Note that the connection from the origin server to 
the target server can also be optionally protected by 
SSL in Shibboleth, but this is used to provide 
confidentiality of the connection rather than message 
origin authentication. In many cases a confidential 
SSL connection between the origin and the target will 
not be required, since the handle is obscure enough to 
stop an intruder from finding anything out about the 
user, whilst the SAML signature makes the message 
exchange authentic.  
 
authentication assertion verifies OK, then 
the resource site has a trusted message 
providing it with a temporary pseudonym 
for the user (the handle), the location of the 
attribute authority at the origin site and the 
resource URL that the user was previously 
trying to access. The resource site then 
returns the handle to the home site’s 
attribute authority in a SAML attribute 
query message and is returned a signed 
SAML attribute assertion message. The 
Shibboleth trust model is that the target site 
trusts the origin site to manage each user’s 
attributes correctly, in whatever way it 
wishes. So the returned SAML attribute 
assertion message, digitally signed by the 
origin, provides proof to the target that the 
authenticated user does have these attributes. 
This message exchange should be protected 
by SSL if confidentiality/privacy of the 
returned attributes is required. The attributes 
in this assertion may then be used to 
authorise the user to access particular areas 
of the resource site, without the resource site 
ever being told the user’s identity. 
 
The latest version of the Shibboleth 
specification has introduced a performance 
improvement over the earlier versions, by 
optionally allowing stage one and stage two 
to be combined together, in that the initial 
digitally signed SAML message may 
optionally contain the user’s attributes as 
well as the authentication assertion. It is 
expected that the Shibboleth software will 
be upgraded to this during 2005. 
 
Shibboleth has two mechanisms to ensure 
user privacy. Firstly it allows a different 
pseudonym for the user’s identity (the 
handle) to be returned each time, and 
secondly it requires that the attribute 
authorities provide some form of control 
over the release of user attributes to resource 
sites, which they term an attribute release 
policy. Both users and administrators should 
have some say over the contents of their 
attribute release policies. This is to minimise 
the loss of a user’s privacy. 
3. An Enhanced Trust Model for 
Shibboleth 
As can be seen from the above overview of 
Shibboleth, its trust model is sound although 
rather limited. The model is that the target 
site trusts the origin site to authenticate its 
users and to manage their attributes correctly 
whilst the origin site trusts the target site to 
provide services to its users. The trust is 
conveyed using digitally signed SAML 
messages using target and origin server 
X.509 key pairs/certificates, configured into 
the Shibboleth software by their filenames. 
(Note that the private key files were held 
unencrypted in the Shibboleth software we 
were using, so this is a weakness in the 
implementation if not actually in the trust 
model.) As each site will typically only have 
one key pair per Shibboleth system, from 
the recipient’s perspective, there is only a 
single point of trust per sending Shibboleth 
system. Although it is not difficult to 
configure multiple roots of trust into a 
Shibboleth target site – it is, in fact, a matter 
of updating one XML file only – the issue is 
one of being able to use a finer grained 
distributed trust model, and of being able to 
use multiple origin site authorities (and 
private keys) to issue and sign the 
authentication and attribute assertions.   
 
In many origin sites a single back end 
LDAP server is the sole authoritative source 
for both authentication and attribute 
information. Typically Shibboleth sites 
implement stage one by issuing a Bind 
operation on their LDAP server, using the 
username and password provided by the user 
to the web login prompt. If the Bind 
succeeds, the user has been successfully 
authenticated against the password stored in 
the LDAP server. Stage two is implemented 
by searching the LDAP server for the 
attributes stored in the user’s entry, and 
filtering these against the Shibboleth 
origin’s attribute release policy before 
returning them to the Shibboleth target site 
as signed SAML attribute assertions. One 
can see that in such an implementation, and 
as a consequence of the Shibboleth trust 
model, the Shibboleth target site has no 
choice but to make access control decisions 
based on these attributes, without knowing 
who actually issued them to the user, 
whether they are still valid or not, or 
whether they are even the correct attributes 
for the particular user, since the user’s name 
is not provided to the target site for privacy 
reasons. The Shibboleth origin doesn’t trust 
anyone to see the attributes except the 
trusted targets, but even they are not allowed 
to see the binding between the attributes and 
the owner’s identity. (The two reasons given 
for this in the Shibboleth documentation are 
user privacy and legal requirements for 
universities to protect a student’s privacy). 
The target site thus has no option but to 
indirectly trust the contents of the origin 
site’s LDAP server or other attribute 
repository, since it trusts the origin site 
directly. One can further see that the origin 
site has to strongly protect the attributes in 
its (LDAP) repository, which means that it is 
probably restricted to centrally 
administering these, and so would prefer 
that they do not change that often. 
Flexibility and distributed management of 
the attributes is hard to adopt. Dynamic 
delegation of authority would be even harder 
to support. 
 
We propose that an enhanced trust model 
should have the following features.  
- Multiple authorities should be able to 
issue attributes to the users, and the 
target site should be able to verify the 
issuer/user bindings. For example, a 
manager should be able to assign a 
project leader attribute to an employee 
under his control. 
- The target should be able to state, in its 
policy, which of the attribute authorities 
it trusts to issue which attributes to 
which groups of users. The target site 
should be able to decide independently 
of the issuing site which attributes and 
authorities to trust when making its 
access control decisions.  
- Not all attribute issuing authorities need 
be part of the origin site. A target site 
should be able to allow a user to gain 
access to its resources if it has attributes 
issued by multiple authorities, for 
example, a target site holding statistics 
on medical data may require a user to 
have an attribute issued by a medical 
authority as well as one issued by the 
university that employs the user as a 
researcher. 
- The trust infrastructure should support 
dynamic delegation of authority, so that 
a holder of a privilege attribute may 
delegate (a subset of) this to another 
person without having to reconfigure 
anything in the system. For example, a 
project leader may wish to assign a role 
of team leader to one of his team 
members; he should be enabled to do 
this dynamically by the infrastructure 
without having to reconfigure the 
system. The target site should be able, in 
turn, to state in its policy whether it 
trusts these delegated attributes or not, 
regardless of the delegation policy at the 
user’s site.  
- The target site should be able to decide if 
it really does trust the origin’s attribute 
repository (e.g. LDAP server), and if 
not, be able to demand a stronger proof 
of attribute entitlement than that 
conferred by a SAML signature from the 
sending Web server. 
- Finally, the origin site, if it chooses, 
should be able to use a Privilege 
Management Infrastructure, rather than a 
strongly protected attribute repository, 
for allocating attributes to its users. This 
will allow the origin to distribute the 
management of attributes throughout its 
site. Nevertheless, the origin site should 
still be able to communicate with 
Shibboleth targets as usual by only 
sending attributes to them, if the targets 
are happy to trust these. 
4. Implementing the Enhanced 
Trust Model using an X.509 PMI 
X.509 attribute certificates (ACs) provide a 
convenient, standardised and compact 
representation of attribute assignments, and 
satisfy several of the above requirements. 
The basic X.509 attribute certificate 
construct comprises: the name of the holder 
of the attributes, the name of the issuing 
authority, the set of attributes, and the time 
that they are valid for. An extension field 
can optionally be inserted to state that the 
holder is allowed to dynamically delegate (a 
subset of) these attributes to another user, 
and the depth to which delegation can take 
place. The whole AC construct is digitally 
signed by the issuer (attribute authority), 
thus providing integrity control and tamper 
resistance. Multiple attribute authorities can 
co-exist, either in a hierarchical relationship 
or as separate independent authorities. 
Attribute certificates are typically long lived, 
and after issuance, the ACs need to be stored 
somewhere for retrieval by the target’s 
policy decision point (PDP), and LDAP 
repositories at the AA site are a natural 
choice for this, although web servers, 
filestores and other repositories can also be 
used. 
 
If the ACs are stored in the AA site’s LDAP 
directory or other repository, and transferred 
from there to the target site’s PDP by 
Shibboleth, then the target site’s PDP does 
not need to indirectly trust the attribute 
repository or the underlying transport 
mechanism used to convey them, since it 
can directly validate the digital signatures on 
the attribute certificates when it receives 
them2. Furthermore, if the target site’s PDP 
policy is willing to allow dynamic 
delegation of authority, the PDP can check 
the attribute certificate chain to ensure that 
all ACs were properly authorised by their 
issuing authorities. By using ACs in its 
authorisation decision making, rather than 
plain attributes, a target site can support 
much more sophisticated and finer grained 
access control policies, for example, by 
requiring a user to have ACs issued by 
multiple authorities, from different issuing 
domains, before they are granted access to 
particular resources. 
 
The PERMIS X.509 PMI is part of the US 
NSF Middleware Initiative software release. 
PERMIS provides a policy controlled role 
based access control (RBAC) infrastructure, 
in which the user’s roles are stored in X.509 
ACs. These ACs are either passed to the 
PERMIS PDP along with the user’s 
requested action (the push model), or can be 
fetched from one or more LDAP servers by 
the PDP (the pull model). The PERMIS 
PDP then returns a granted or denied 
response according to the policy in force at 
that time. The PERMIS policy is written in 
XML, and is in many respects a simplified 
alternative to XACML [6], although the 
PERMIS policy supports dynamic 
delegation of authority, unlike XACML.  
The XML policy is itself stored in an X.509 
attribute certificate, and is digitally signed 
by the trusted authority in control of a target 
resource. This policy certificate is the root of 
                                                 
2 It is the case with ACs that the holder’s identity is 
revealed in the Holder field of the AC. But the 
Holder field could still be an opaque string, 
understood by the Issuer at the Origin, and it doesn’t 
have to be understood by the AC verifier at the 
Target site. See section 6 for a fuller discussion of 
this issue. 
trust for the access control decision making. 
When the PERMIS PDP is initialised, it is 
given the name of the trusted authority, and 
the ID of the policy to use (each policy has a 
globally unique identifier). PERMIS reads in 
the policy certificates from the authority’s 
LDAP entry, checks their signatures, and 
keeps the one with the correct ID. It now has 
the correct trusted policy with which to 
make access control decisions. PERMIS 
thus forms a good basis for demonstrating 
the distributed management of trust with 
Shibboleth. 
4.1 The PERMIS PDP Policy  
The PERMIS policy contains a list of trusted 
attribute authorities, the set of attributes they 
are trusted to assign, and the groups of users 
they can be assigned to. This is called the 
role allocation sub-policy (RAP). Attribute 
authorities can be distributed worldwide, 
and can be trusted to issue ACs to users 
from any domain, according to the RAP. 
When the PERMIS PDP is passed a set of 
attribute certificates by Shibboleth, it can 
determine from the RAP which are trusted 
to keep, and which should be discarded as 
untrusted. All the trusted attributes are 
extracted and stored for later access control 
decision making. 
 
The PERMIS policy also contains the set of 
targets that are being protected by this 
policy, the associated actions that can be 
performed on them (along with their 
parameters), and the attributes (or roles) that 
a user needs in order to be granted the 
access. In addition, constraints can be placed 
on these grants, such as, only between 9am 
and 5pm, or only if the user holds non-
conflicting roles3, or only if the size is less 
than 3Mbytes etc. This is called the target 
access sub-policy (TAP). When the 
PERMIS PDP is asked if a user with the 
                                                 
3 Separation of duties is currently being implemented 
but is not in the current NMI release. 
current roles/attributes is allowed to access a 
particular target resource, it consults the 
TAP and returns granted or denied based on 
its contents and the current state of the 
environment (time of day, resource usage 
etc.). 
 
Because PERMIS can act in either push or 
pull mode with attribute certificates, then it 
is possible for a target site to create a policy 
that requires a user to have attributes issued 
by multiple different authorities in different 
domains, and the PERMIS PDP can then 
pull these at authorisation time regardless of 
the origin site that the user has actually 
authenticated to. 
5. Supporting the different trust 
models of Shibboleth sites 
One can immediately see that if Shibboleth 
and PERMIS are integrated together, then 
the enhanced distributed trust model that we 
wish to provide to target and origin sites can 
be obtained. However, a number of 
misalignments between PERMIS and 
Shibboleth need to be addressed first. Either 
Shibboleth needs to transfer X.509 attribute 
certificates (ACs) from the origin site to the 
resource site instead of plain attributes, or 
PERMIS needs to be modified to accept 
plain attributes instead of X.509 ACs. In 
fact, both of these methods have been 
implemented so as to provide resource sites 
with the maximum of flexibility. We have 
modified the Shibboleth origin site to 
retrieve X.509 ACs from its LDAP 
directory, and to pass these as text encoded 
binary attributes within the SAML attribute 
assertions. This facility should be provided 
as part of the standard Shibboleth software 
release during 2005. We have also modified 
the code that calls the PERMIS PDP to 
validate the plain attributes from Shibboleth 
and use these instead of or as well as X.509 
ACs. 
 
Since it is the target site’s resources that are 
being accessed, we are primarily concerned 
with the trust that a target site is expected or 
required to have in the attributes that it 
receives in order for it to become Shibboleth 
enabled. An origin site will also have its 
own preferred trust model for the allocation 
of attributes, but the target site’s trust model 
must always take precedence since it is the 
owner of the resources that are being 
accessed. We can look at trust from two 
different aspects: the distribution of trust in 
the attribute issuing authorities (centralised 
or distributed) and the trustworthiness of an 
origin site’s attribute repository (trusted or 
not).  
 
Firstly, we consider the distribution of trust. 
In the simplest case the origin site has a 
single attribute issuing authority. If the 
target site trusts the origin site’s attribute 
authority, this authority can issue and sign 
all the SAML attribute assertions. (This is 
the standard Shibboleth model.) 
Alternatively, the origin site may wish to 
distribute the management of attributes 
between different trusted authorities in its 
domain and to allow dynamic delegation of 
authority. If the target site wishes to 
distribute its trust to these different 
authorities, then it can allow (trust) each one 
of them to issue and sign different attribute 
assertions, and further decide if it will allow 
dynamic delegation of authority to take 
place. Furthermore, in this distributed trust 
scenario, the target site may be willing to 
trust, or even require, some attribute 
authorities that are not even based at the 
origin site to issue attributes to users. (This 
is typically the case in today’s world when 
one presents plastic cards from multiple 
different issuers in order to gain access to a 
particular resource e.g. access to an airport 
business lounge may be granted by 
presenting frequent flyer cards from a 
number of different airlines or diners clubs.) 
On the other hand, if the target site is not 
willing to recognise these multiple 
authorities, then the origin site will need to 
(re-)sign all the SAML attribute assertions 
by the single authority that the target site is 
willing to trust.   
 
Secondly, we consider the origin site’s 
attribute repository (typically an LDAP 
server). If either the target or origin site do 
not trust this to store unprotected attributes 
securely, then the origin will need to store 
digitally signed attributes in it, rather than 
plain attributes.  We now consider each 
combination in turn. Figure 1 pictorially 
represents each of the trust models shown in 
the following sections. 
5.1 Target trusts origin’s attribute 
repository and origin as a single 
attribute authority  
This is the original Shibboleth trust model 
and both the target site and origin site will 
use standard Shibboleth. The origin will 
store plain attributes in its repository, and 
pass them in digitally signed SAML 
messages to the target. The target site may 
use the standard Shibboleth authorisation 
mechanism, or optionally, for a finer grained 
and more refined access control mechanism, 
use a policy controlled PDP to make 
decisions. When using the PERMIS PDP for 
authorisation, the PERMIS target access 
sub-policy (TAP) is used to say which 
attributes are needed in order to gain access 
to the targets, and the (unsigned) attributes 












































5.5 Multiple AAs at Origin not trusted by Target
TAP




Figure1. Pictorial representation of different trust models 
 
5.2 Origin wishes to distribute 
attribute assignments and target 
trusts different attribute 
authorities at the origin 
In this scenario the origin distributes 
management between multiple authorities 
and therefore must store attribute certificates 
in its repository, so that the different 
attribute authorities can be recognised by the 
target. The target site uses the role 
assignment sub-policy (RAP) to describe 
who it trusts to assign which attributes to 
whom, and the TAP to determine which 
attributes are needed in order to access 
which targets. Note that the target may only 
trust a subset of the actual attribute 
authorities at the origin site, according to its 
RAP, and the policy specification allows for 
this. Additionally, the target may allow 
dynamic delegation of authority at the origin 
site, by specifying this in the RAP4. 
Shibboleth now fetches attribute certificates 
from the origin site, rather than plain 
attributes. Consequently the SAML attribute 
assertions do no need to be signed, though 
the link will still need to be SSL encrypted if 
privacy protection is required. In this 
scenario the origin’s attribute repository 
may or may not be trusted by either the 
target or the origin, but this is not an issue 
since it is storing digitally signed ACs in the 
repository. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that the enforcement of dynamic delegation of 
authority is currently being implemented and will be 
in a future release of PERMIS. 
5.3 Target trusts different attribute 
authorities at the origin site and 
elsewhere 
In this scenario, the target site wishes to 
authorise users based on attributes assigned 
to them by different attribute authorities that 
are not always co-located with the origin 
site. In this case, the origin site cannot push 
all the attributes to the target site (unless the 
AAs have distributed them to the origin site 
in the first place, which cannot be 
guaranteed), so the target will need to 
operate in pull mode and fetch the ACs that 
it needs directly from the AAs.  The 
PERMIS PDP can operate in pull mode and 
fetch all the attribute certificates that are 
needed from the various distributed (LDAP) 
repositories. The SAML attribute assertions 
from the origin site do not need to carry any 
attribute certificates in this instance. They 
only need to provide the holder identity of 
the user, so that the target can know which 
ACs to retrieve. Of course, each attribute 
authority will need to let its repository 
(LDAP server) be accessed by the target 
site5. Once the ACs have been retrieved, the 
target’s PDP will use the RAP to determine 
which ACs are trusted, and the TAP to 
determine if the user has the necessary 
attributes to access the resource. 
5.4 Target and/or origin do not 
trust origin’s attribute repository 
but target trusts origin as a single 
attribute authority 
In this scenario the origin cannot store 
unsigned attributes in its repository, but 
rather should store digitally signed attributes 
in its (LDAP) repository. The exact format 
of these could be X.509 attribute certificates 
or (long lived) SAML attribute assertions. 
                                                 
5 Note that if a site’s firewall prevents the LDAP 
protocol from passing through, there are several http 
to ldap gateways available that allow the firewall to 
be tunnelled through on port 80. 
These should all be signed by the same 
organisational attribute authority that is 
trusted by the target. Shibboleth will then 
carry either signed attribute certificates or 
signed SAML assertions to the target site. 
(Note that the latter is equivalent to the 
model in 5.1). When the ACs are handed to 
the PDP, the RAP will check that they have 
been issued by the sole origin authority. The 
TAP is then used to determine if the user has 
sufficient attributes to be granted access to 
the target or not. When Shibboleth is 
transferring attribute certificates in the 
SAML assertions, the assertions do not need 
to be signed, though SSL encryption will be 
needed if privacy protection is required. 
5.5 Origin wishes to distribute 
trust to multiple authorities, but 
target does not recognise them 
In this scenario the target wishes to run 
standard Shibboleth but the origin wishes to 
distribute the management of attributes to 
different AAs i.e. to run its own PMI, with 
all the advantages this brings such as 
dynamic delegation of authority. The origin 
will be creating and storing attribute 
certificates in its AC repository signed by 
multiple distributed attribute authorities. 
However, because the target wishes to run 
standard Shibboleth, and wants a single 
point of trust at the origin, these ACs cannot 
be passed to the target. Therefore the origin 
site should run a PDP with its own RAP to 
validate that the ACs are issued in 
accordance with its own policy. This will 
validate the stored attribute certificates, 
extract the attributes that are trusted and 
pass these to the local Shibboleth origin 
server for transfer in signed SAML attribute 
assertions to the target. The target site can 
then run the standard Shibboleth 
authorisation module, or for finer grained 
control can run its own PDP and TAP, as in 
5.1, to determine if the user is to be granted 
access or not. 
6 User Privacy Issues 
One of the limiting factors of X.509 attribute 
certificates (ACs) is that they bind the 
attributes to the holder, and if the holder is 
identified by their real name in the AC e.g. 
{CN=David Chadwick, OU=Computing 
Laboratory, O=University of Kent, C=GB} 
then the user’s privacy is (at least partially) 
lost. There are a number of solutions to this 
problem. X.509 ACs allow holders to be 
identified in a number of different ways. 
Firstly, they can be identified by a 
distinguished name (DN). However, this DN 
does not need to be the real name of the 
holder or indeed in any way be similar to the 
holder’s real name. It can be a pseudonym 
rather than their real name e.g. 
{CN=123456789}, or even a group name 
e.g. {CN=Programmer, OU=Computing 
Laboratory, O=University of Kent, C=GB}. 
This opaque name only needs to have 
meaning to the issuing site. The mapping 
between the user’s login/authentication 
identity and AC holder identity would be 
performed at authentication time by the 
origin site’s authentication server. It is 
important to note that the binding between 
the pseudonym in the AC and the 
authentication name of the human user is 
handled not by normal PKI registration 
procedures, but by the origin authentication 
system, so that the target site’s trust in user 
authentication has to be placed in the origin 
site’s systems and not in a trusted third party 
CA.  Further, the use of pseudonyms or 
group names will make it much more 
difficult for independent AC issuers to 
participate in distributed trust management, 
since they will need to liaise with the origin 
site to know which opaque names have been 
given to which users. 
 
The difference between using a pseudonym 
and a group identity is that in the former 
case the target site would be able to profile 
the user, without knowing the real physical 
identity of the user. With a group identity 
the target site would only be able to profile 
the whole group, and would not be able to 
differentiate between different group 
members, or know how many members 
were in the group. 
 
Secondly, the holder can be identified 
indirectly by reference to their X.509 public 
key certificate. In this case the attribute 
certificate holds the serial number and issuer 
name of the user’s public key certificate e.g. 
{x509serialNumber=123456 + x509issuer = 
{OU=Some CA, O=Some Org, C=US}. The 
limitations of this method are that the user 
must be PKI enabled, which of course, many 
are not; and that, depending upon the 
contents of the user’s public key certificate, 
the user might be identified via this.  
 
Finally, the holder can be identified 
indirectly by reference to the hash of a 
public key that they hold. This is now 
effectively a random number, giving good 
privacy protection. The user can prove 
ownership of the attribute certificate by 
digitally signing a challenge provided by the 
origin authentication server, which can then 
provide this AC to the target site. The 
restrictions are that the user needs to be 
using some form of asymmetric 
cryptography, has generated their own 
private/public key pair, has created a self 
signed certificate with a random DN and 
does not have a corresponding X.509 public 
key certificate identifying him/her. The main 
limitation from a privacy perspective is that 
the target site can profile the user, without 
knowing the actual identity of the user, since 
the same public key hash is used each time. 
 
In all these cases there is a trade-off between 
the “degree of anonymity” and the “quality 
of issuance”. At one extreme we have 
dynamically generated Shibboleth short 
lived signed SAML attribute assertions that 
provide anonymity but require a trusted 
directory to store the user’s attributes. At the 
other extreme we have long lived ACs 
where each attribute authority can issue its 
own attributes in a controlled manner, but 
without any privacy protection. At various 
points in the middle we have long lived ACs 
with various forms of privacy protection 
(pseudonyms, group names and public key 
identifiers) where the AA or authentication 
system maps the user’s name into a privacy 
protected one. 
 
In addition to protecting the identity of the 
AC holder, the AC issuer name may also be 
protected in the same ways as above. Note 
that the name of the SOA may be privacy 
protected or pseudonymised in some way, 
but the target PDP will need to know who 
this name actually belongs to if it is to be 
configured as a root of trust. The privacy of 
the embedded attributes may be protected by 
encryption, as described in [3] and [7]. 
Different attributes can be encrypted for 
different target sites. The main disadvantage 
of encrypted attributes is that the issuer 
needs to know in advance, when creating the 
AC, who the targets are going to be. This of 
course may not always be possible with 
relatively long lived ACs, in which case SSL 
encryption of the communications link is a 
better option for attribute privacy. 
7 Revocation and Performance 
Issues 
The signed SAML assertions of Shibboleth 
do not need to be revoked due to their short 
life times. Attribute certificates on the other 
hand are expected to have a relatively long 
life time, according to the 
privileges/attributes being allocated. For 
example, one might expect a “student” 
attribute certificate to be valid for an entire 
academic year. Whilst signed SAML 
attribute assertions have the performance 
overhead of requiring a digital signature per 
message sent by the origin site, long lived 
ACs may have the overhead of requiring 
revocation list processing, depending upon 
how they are stored and distributed. If the 
ACs are stored in a repository under the 
control of the issuer, and are retrieved from 
there by either the Shibboleth origin or 
target sites, or directly by the target’s PDP, 
then a revocation list may be avoidable 
providing the issuer deletes the ACs when 
they need to be revoked, and third parties 
are not able to surreptitiously write them 
back again. In this way the revoked ACs 
will not be available to the PDP when either 
it or the Shibboleth components try to 
retrieve them. If on the other hand the ACs 
are not stored in a repository under the 
control of the issuer, for example, they are 
distributed directly to their holders, then 
standard attribute certificate revocation lists 
(ACRLs) will be needed, and the issuer will 
need to periodically update them, in exactly 
the same way as for public key certificate 
CRLs. The PDP will need to ensure that it 
has a current ACRL when validating the 
ACs that have been presented to it. This will 
cause some performance overhead at the 
target site. Short lived ACs on the other 
hand do not need ACRLs to be published, 
just as the short lived SAML assertions do 
no require them. Whilst short lived ACs do 
not have the distributed trust management 
benefits of long lived ones (one cannot 
expect human managers to issue ACs to 
their staff daily, whilst automated issuing 
servers have the same trust related problems 
as existing Shibboleth implementations), 
they do have a significant performance 
benefit over signed XML messages [8] [9], 
so they might still be worthy of 
consideration in this respect. 
8 Conclusions 
We have shown how a distributed, finer 
grained and more functional trust model can 
be added to Shibboleth, to increase the 
latter’s flexibility and authorisation decision 
making capabilities. We have further shown 
how the model can support target and origin 
sites using different combinations of 
centralised and distributed trust models, and 
different assumptions concerning the 
trustworthiness of the origin’s attribute 
repository. We have implemented this 
distributed trust model in Shibboleth by 
combining it with the PERMIS authorisation 
infrastructure and X.509 attribute 
certificates. Finally we have argued that user 
privacy does not need to be compromised 
per se by using long lived X.509 attribute 
certificates instead of short lived digitally 
signed SAML attribute assertions, although 
it is certainly more difficult to fully protect a 
user’s privacy in the former case. 
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